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Abstract
We consider a simple model for the evolution of a limit order book in which limit orders
of unit size arrive according to independent Poisson processes. The frequencies of buy
limit orders below a given price level, respectively sell limit orders above a given level are
described by fixed demand and supply functions. Buy (resp. sell) limit orders that arrive
above (resp. below) the current ask (resp. bid) price are converted into market orders.
There is no cancellation of limit orders. This model has independently been reinvented by
several authors, including Stigler in 1964 and Luckock in 2003, who was able to calculate
the equilibrium distribution of the bid and ask prices. We extend the model by introducing
market makers that simultaneously place both a buy and sell limit order at the current
bid and ask price. We show how the introduction of market makers reduces the spread,
which in the original model is unrealistically large. In particular, we are able to calculate
the exact rate at which market makers need to place orders in order to close the spread
completely. If this rate is exceeded, we show that the price settles at a random level that
in general does not correspond the Walrasian equilibrium price.
MSC 2010. Primary: 82C27; Secondary: 60K35, 82C26, 60K25
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1 Introduction
1.1 Informal description of the model
We will be interested in a simple mathematical model for the evolution of a limit order book, as
used on a stock market or commodity market. The basic model we are interested in has been
independently (re-)invented at least four times, by [Sti64, Luc03, Pla11, Yud12b]. The aim of
the model is not so much to identify optimal strategies for traders, but rather to identify, in a
simplified set-up, the basic mechanisms that lie behind the observed shape and time evolution
of real order books.
Even in regard to this modest aim, the original model as first formulated in [Luc03] is
not particularly succesful. Indeed, it leads to a highly unrealistic order book, in which the
spread is very large, while far from the equilibrium price the number of limit orders grows
without bounds. In the present paper we propose an extension of the model that fixes one
unrealistic aspect of the original model, by closing the spread (at least for a special choice
of the parameters), but retains other unrealistic features. Nevertheless, it is hoped that by
identifying the basic mechanisms that lie behind the behavior of simple models, eventually a
more realistic model can be developed that leads to a better understanding of the mechanisms
that shape real order books.
Since our aim is not to identify trading strategies, we allow traders to behave in a way
that can be far from their optimal strategy, which in a setting where time is continuous and
trading is open ended may anyway be hard to identify. Also, we do not identify individual
traders, i.e., we allow for the possibility that some of the orders arriving at different times
may in fact be placed by one and the same trader, but do not record this information.
Our starting point is the model as first formulated in full generality in [Luc03]. In this
model, limit orders of unit size arrive according to independent Poisson processes. The fre-
quencies of buy limit orders below a given price level, respectively sell limit orders above a
given level are described by fixed demand and supply functions. Buy (resp. sell) limit orders
that arrive above (resp. below) the current ask (resp. bid) price are converted into market
orders. There is no cancellation of limit orders. Following [Swa18], we add a second type
of traders, who always place market orders, regardless of the current price levels. From a
modeling point of view, we can view these orders as buy (resp. sell) that arrive at such a high
(resp. low) prices that they are always converted into market orders, except when there are
currently no matching sell (resp. buy) limit orders in the order book. From a mathematical
point of view, the addition of this kind of orders is useful since it allows for positive recurrent
behavior, which is never possible in the original model.
The novelty of the present paper kies in the introduction a new type of trader, who is a
market maker or more general any liquidity supplier, who instead of only buying or selling
does both, with the aim of making a profit from the spread. We model the effect of such
market makers by saying that according to a fixed Poisson rate, a buy and sell limit order of
unit size are simultaneously placed at the current bid and ask prices.
In Section 3.2, we adapt the method of Luckock [Luc03] for calculating the spread to the
generalized model (Theorem 3) and show that the introduction of market makers reduces
the spread, until it closes completely if the rate at which market makers place orders equals
the Walrasian volume of trade. In Section 3.3 we show that if the rate of market making is
increased beyond this point, then the bid and ask prices converge to a random limit that does
not need to correspond to the Walrasian equilibrium price (Theorem 4).
In the remainder of this introduction, we formulate our model precisely and settle notation
(Subsection 1.2) and discuss its history (Subsection 1.3). Section 2 is devoted to the original
model due to Stigler and Luckock while Section 3 discusses the new phenomena due to the
introduction of market making.
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1.2 Definition of the model
Let I = (I−, I+) ⊂ R be a nonempty open interval, modelling the possible prices of limit
orders, and let I = [I−, I+] ⊂ [−∞,∞] denote its closure. Recall that a counting measure
on I is a measure µ that can be written as a countable sum of delta measures. At any given
time, we represent the state of the order book by a pair (X−,X+) of counting measures on I,
where we interpret the delta measures that X− (resp. X+) is composed of as buy (resp. sell)
limit orders of unit size at a given price. We assume that:
(i) there are no x, y ∈ I such that x ≤ y and X+({x}) > 0, X−({y}) > 0,
(ii) X−
(
[x, I+)
)
<∞ and X+
(
I−, x]
)
<∞ for all x ∈ I.
Here, the first condition says that the order book cannot simultaneously contain a buy and
sell limit order when the ask price of the seller is lower than or equal to the bid price of the
buyer. The second condition guarantees that
M− :=max
(
{I−} ∪ {x ∈ I : X
−({x}) > 0}
)
,
M+ :=min
(
{I+} ∪ {x ∈ I : X
+({x}) > 0}
)
,
(1.1)
are well-defined, which can be interpreted as the current bid and ask prices. Note that M± :=
I± if the order book contains no limit orders of the given type. It is often convenient to
represent the order book by the signed counting measure X := X+ −X−. We let Sord denote
the space of all signed measures of this form, with X− and X+ satisfying the conditions (i)
and (ii) above.
The dynamics of the model are described by two functions λ± : I → R, which we call the
demand function λ− and supply function λ+, and a nonnegative constant ρ ≥ 0, which will
represent the rate of market makers. We assume that:
(A1) λ− is nonincreasing, λ+ is nondecreasing,
(A2) λ± are continuous functions,
(A3) λ+ − λ− is strictly increasing,
(A4) λ± > 0 on I.
We let dλ± denote the measures on I defined by dλ±
(
[x, y]
)
:= λ±(y)− λ±(x) (x, y ∈ I, x ≤
y). In particular, dλ− is a negative measure and dλ+ is a positive measure. We consider
a continuous-time Markov process (Xt)t≥0 that takes values in the space Sord and whose
dynamics have the following description.
Buy orders inside the interval With Poisson local rate −dλ−, a trader comes and
places a buy limit order at a price x, or takes the best available sell limit order at a price
≤ x, if there is one, i.e., X 7→ X − δx∧M+ .
Buy orders outside the intervalWith Poisson rate λ−(I+), a trader comes and takes
the best available sell limit order, if there is one, i.e., X 7→ X − δM+ if M
+ < I+ and
nothing happens otherwise.
Sell orders inside the interval With Poisson local rate dλ+, a trader comes and
places a sell limit order at a price x, or takes the best available buy limit order at a price
≥ x, if there is one, i.e., X 7→ X + δx∨M− .
Sell orders outside the intervalWith Poisson rate λ+(I−), a trader comes and takes
the best available buy limit order, if there is one, i.e., X 7→ X + δM− if M
− > I− and
nothing happens otherwise.
3
Market makers With Poisson rate ρ, a market maker arrives who places both a buy
and sell limit order at the current ask and bid prices, provided these lie inside I, i.e.,
X 7→ X − 1{M−>I−}δM− + 1{M+<I+}δM+ .
Here, the phrase “with Poisson local rate dλ+” means that sell limit orders with prices inside
some measurable set A ⊂ I arrive with Poisson rate dλ+(A), which is independent for dis-
joint sets A. We assume that all Poisson processes governing different mechanisms (buy/sell
market/limit orders, and market makers) are independent. After [Sti64, Luc03], we call the
Markov process (Xt)t≥0 the Stigler-Luckock model with demand and supply functions λ± and
rate of market makers ρ.
We make the assumptions (A2)–(A4) for technical simplicity. As explained in Appendix
A.1 of [Swa18], these assumptions can basically be made without loss of generality. In partic-
ular, models for which (A2) and (A3) fail can be obtained as functions of models for which
(A2) and (A3) hold. In particular, this applies to discrete models in which limit orders can
only be placed at integer prices. To explain this on a concrete example, consider a model with
a price interval of the form I = (0, 2n) where n ≥ 1 is some integer, and demand and supply
functions that satisfy
dλ− = −1{⌈x⌉ is even}dx and dλ+ = −1{⌈x⌉ is odd}dx, (1.2)
i.e., the measure dλ− has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure which is −1 on
the intervals (1, 2], (3, 4],. . . and zero elsewhere, and likewise, the density of dλ+ is +1 on the
intervals (0, 1], (2, 3],. . . and zero elsewhere. Let (Xt)t≥0 denote a model with such demand
and supply functions (which satisfy (A1)–(A4)) and let X ′t := Xt ◦ ψ
−1 denote the image of
the measure Xt under the map
ψ(x) := ⌈x/2⌉ (x ∈ I). (1.3)
Then (X ′t )t≥0 is a model in which limit orders can ony be placed at discrete prices in {1, . . . , n}.
In particular, buy and sell limit orders at prices that in the original model lie in an interval
of the form (2(k − 1), 2k) are placed in such a way that they always match, with buy orders
on the right of sell orders. After applying the map ψ all these orders are mapped to the price
k, i.e., they still match.
1.3 History of the model
The first reference for a model of the type we have just described is Stigler [Sti64], who simu-
lated a model with λ±(I∓) = 0 and ρ = 0 where −dλ− and dλ+ are the uniform distributions
on a set of 10 prices. Luckock [Luc03] (who was apparently unaware of Stigler’s work) con-
sidered the general model with demand and supply functions satisfying λ±(I∓) = 0 and with
ρ = 0. Assuming a special sort of stationarity, Luckock was able to find explicit expressions for
the equilibrium distribution of the bid and ask prices of his model. In [Pla11], the model was
once again independently reinvented, this time with −dλ− and dλ+ the uniform distributions
on a set of 100 prices. Building on this and Luckock’s work, models with λ±(I∓) > 0 were
considered in [Swa18], who was able to give a precise criterion for the positive recurrence of
such models. In the meantime, Yudovina [Yud12a, Yud12b], who was unaware of the previous
references, in her Ph.D. thesis considered the model for a general class of demand and supply
functions (though less general than those of Luckock) and also introduced a construction in-
volving infinite piles of limit orders that is mathematically equivalent to setting λ±(I∓) > 0.
Together with Kelly [KY18], under certain technical conditions, they were able to prove that
the limit inferior and limit superior as time tends to infinity of the bid and ask prices have
certain deterministic values, that they were able to calculate explicitly.
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A characteristic feature of the Stigler-Luckock model is that buy and sell orders arrive
at a rate that is independent of the current price. By contrast, a number of authors have
considered models where limit orders are placed at rates that are relative to the price of the
last transaction [Mas00] or the opposite best quote [CST10, SRR17]. A very general but rather
complicated model is formulated in [Smi12]. See also [CTPA11] and chapter 4 of [Sla13] for
a (partial) overview of the literature up to that point. Several authors also allow cancellation
of orders.
In real markets, much of the trade seems to come from traders who speculate on the price
going up or down. In view of this, a model where orders are placed relative to the current
price may appear more realistic than the model we are interested in. Nevertheless, for an
asset to be interesting for traders, there must always be some real demand and supply in the
background, no matter how much this may be obscured by other effects. An unrealistic aspect
of our model is that even traders who have a genuine interest in the asset and are not merely
speculating will usually not place limit orders very far from the current price, but rather wait
until the price reaches a level that is acceptable to them. Thus, limit orders that are visibly
written into the order book in our model may in reality not be visible, although they are in a
sense still there in the form of traders silently waiting for the price to go up or down.
The impossibility to cancel a limit order is surely an unrealistic aspect of the Stigler-
Luckcock model, that moreover greatly affects its long-time behavior. Nevertheless, neglecting
cancellation of orders may not be too bad on intermediate time scales. Thus, the stationary
behavior of the model may be thought of as an idealization of the quasi-stationary behavior
of real markets on time scales when the number of orders is already large but cancellation is
not yet an important aspect of the market.1
In the days before electronic trading, market makers on the floor of the exchange would
match buy and sell orders. Even though nowadays, market makers are not formally separated
from other traders, they still exist in the form of liquidity suppliers that are distinguished from
other traders by having a different motivation for trading. Rather than being interested in
buying or selling an asset or speculating on the future development of its price, market makers
place both buy and sell orders, at a high volume, with the aim of profiting from the small
difference between the bid and ask prices. The strategy we have chosen for market makers is
extremely simple. Depending on the current state of the order book and the expected behavior
of the other traders, more intelligent choices may be possible. We will see, however, that the
presence of market makers in itself has a huge effect on the shape of the order book. After
this is taken into account, their present strategy may prove not to be too unrealistic.
From a purely mathematical prespective, the Stigler-Luckock model is similar to a number
of other models that are motivated by other applications. We mention in particular the Bak
Sneppen model [BS93] and its modification by Meester and Sarkar [MS12], a model for canyon
formation [Swa17], as well as the queueing models for email communication of Baraba´si [Bar05]
and Gabrielli and Caldarelli [CG09]. All these models are “rank-based” in the sense that the
dynamics are based on the relative order of the particles and all models contain some rule
of the form “kill the lowest (or highest) particle”. For the model of [CG09], the shape of
the stationary process near the critical point has been studied in [FS16] and these authors
conjecture that their results also hold for the Stigler-Luckock model.
1If in the dynamics of the Stigler-Luckock model, one replaces the infinite lifetime of limit orders by an
exponential one, then the model becomes positive recurrent for any value of the parameters and the competitive
window (see Section 2.1) becomes ill-defined. Nevertheless, as long as the cancellation rate is small compared
to the arrival rate of orders, the quasi-stationary behavior of such a model is well approximated by a model
without cancellation, and the competitive window can be understood in a limiting sense.
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure 1: Simulation of the “uniform” Stigler-Luckock model with I = [0, 1], λ−(x) = 1 − x,
and λ+(x) = x. Shown is the state of the order book after the arrival of 10, 000 traders
(starting from an empty order book).
2 Behavior of the model without market makers
2.1 The competitive window
Consider a Stigler-Luckock model with λ±(I∓) = 0 and without market makers (i.e., ρ = 0).
Assumptions (A1)–(A4) imply that there exists a unique price xW ∈ I and constant VW > 0
such that
λ−(xW) = λ+(xW) =: VW. (2.1)
Classical economic theory going back to Walras [Wal74] says that in a perfectly liquid market
in equilibrium, a commodity with demand and supply functions λ± is traded at the price
xW and the volume of trade is given by VW. We call xW the Walrasian price and VW the
Walrasian volume of trade.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the absence of market makers, Stigler-Luckock models turn
out to be highly non-liquid. Indeed, buyers willing to pay a price above the Walrasian price
xW and sellers willing to sell for a price below xW may have to wait a considerable time
before they get their trade, since the bid and ask prices do not settle at xW but instead keep
fluctuating in a competitive window (x−, x+) which satisfies λ−(x−) = λ+(x+). As a result,
Luckock’s volume of trade VL := λ−(x−) = λ+(x+) is larger than the Walrasian volume of
trade VW and in fact larger than it could be at any fixed price level.
Figure 1 shows the result of a numerical simulation of the uniform model with I = [0, 1],
λ−(x) = 1−x, and λ+(x) = x. Depicted is the state of the order book, started from the empty
initial state, after the arrival of 10,000 traders. This and more precise simulations suggest
that the boundaries of the competitive window are given by x− ≈ 0.218 and x+ ≈ 0.782. In
the long run, buy limit orders at prices below x− and sell limit orders at prices above x+
stay in the order book forever, while all other orders are eventually matched. As a result,
Luckcock’s volume of trade VL ≈ 0.782 is considerably higher than the Walrasian volume
of trade VW = 0.5. Luckock [Luc03] described a method how to calculate x−, x+, and VL.
In particular, for the uniform model, his method predicts that VL = 1/z with z the unique
solution of the equation e−z− z+1 = 0. To explain Luckock’s formula for VL, we need to look
at restricted models.
2.2 Restricted models
Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Stigler-Luckock model defined by demand and supply functions λ± : I → R
and rate of market makers ρ ≥ 0. Let (J−, J+) = J ⊂ I be an open subinterval of I and let
λ′± : J → R be the restrictions of the functions λ± to J . Let (X
′
t)t≥0 be the Stigler-Luckock
model on J defined by the by the demand and supply functions λ′± and the rate of market
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makers ρ. We call (X ′t )t≥0 the restricted model on J . Its dynamics are the same as for the
original model (Xt)t≥0, except that limit orders arriving outside J cannot be written into the
order book. Instead, buy limit orders arriving at prices in [J+, I+) are converted into buy
market orders while buy limit orders arriving at prices in (I−, J−] have no effect. Similar rules
apply to sell limit orders. Note that as long as the bid and ask prices M±t stay inside J , the
evolution of both models inside J is the same, i.e., restricting the measure Xt to J yields X
′
t .
Consider, in particular, a Stigler-Luckock model with λ±(I∓) = 0 and without market
makers (i.e., ρ = 0). Let λ−1− : [0, λ−(I−)] → I and λ
−1
+ : [0, λ+(I+)] → I denote the left-
continuous inverses of the functions λ− and λ+, respectively, i.e.,
λ−1− (V ) := sup{x ∈ I : λ−(x) ≥ V } and λ
−1
+ (V ) := inf{x ∈ I : λ+(x) ≥ V }. (2.2)
Let Vmax := λ−(I−)∧ λ+(I+) denote the maximal possible volume of trade. To avoid triviali-
ties, let us assume that
(A5) VW < Vmax.
By the continuity of the demand and supply functions, for each V ∈ (VW, Vmax], setting
J(V ) := (λ−1− (V ), λ
−1
+ (V )) defines a subinterval J(V ) ⊂ I such that λ−(J−(V )) = V =
λ+(J+(V )). For later use, we define a continuous, strictly increasing function Φ : [VL, Vmax]→
R with Φ(0) = 0 by
Φ(V ) :=
∫
V
VW
{ 1
λ+
(
λ−1− (W )
) + 1
λ−
(
λ−1+ (W )
)} 1
W 2
dW. (2.3)
By definition, a Stigler-Luckock model is positive recurrent if started from an empty order
book, it returns to the empty state in finite expected time. The following facts have been
proved in [Swa18].
Proposition 1 (Luckock’s volume of trade) Assume (A1)–(A5), λ±(I∓) = 0 and ρ = 0.
Then, for each V ∈ (VW, Vmax), the restricted Stigler-Luckock model on J(V ) is positive
recurrent if and only if Φ(V ) < 1/V 2
W
.
Proof This follows from Proposition 2, Theorem 3, and formula (1.22) in [Swa18].
Proposition 1 suggests that Luckcock’s volume of trade should be given by
VL = sup
{
V ∈ [VW, Vmax) : Φ(V ) < 1/V
2
W
}
, (2.4)
and that the competitive window is given by (x−, x+) = J(VL) =
(
λ−1− (VL), λ
−1
+ (VL)
)
. These
formulas agree well with numerical simulations and also agree with the (somewhat more com-
plicated) method for calculating VL described in [Luc03]. For the uniform model, one can
check that one obtains for VL the constant described at the end of the previous subsection.
Under certain additional technical assumptions on λ±, which include the uniform model, it
has been proved in [KY18, Thms 2.1 and 2.2] that the limit inferior and limit superior of the
bid and ask prices are a.s. given by the boundaries of the competitive window, as we have just
calculated it.
We note that VL > VW always but it is possible that VL = Vmax. In the latter case, the
competitive window is the whole interval I. For example, this happens for the model with
I = [0, 1], λ−(x) = (1 − x)
α, and λ+(x) = x
α if 0 < α ≤ 1/2. In the next subsection, we will
see that if VL < Vmax and one assumes that the restricted model on the competitive window
has an invariant law, then the equilibrium distributions of the bid and ask prices are given by
the unique solutions of a certain differential equation.
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2.3 Stationary models
By definition, an invariant law for a Stigler-Luckock model is a probability law on Sord so that
the process started in this initial law is stationary. We let
Sfinord :=
{
X ∈ Sord : X
− and X+ are finite measures
}
(2.5)
denote the subspace of Sord consisting of all states in which the order book contains only
finitely many orders. If a Stigler-Luckock model is positive recurrent, then it has a unique
invariant law that is moreover concentrated on Sfin
ord
(see [Swa18, Thm 3]). In particular, this
applies to the restricted model on J(V ) for any V < VL. If VL < Vmax, then it is believed
that the restricted model on the competitive window J(VL) also has a unique invariant law,
but this invariant law is not concentrated on Sfin
ord
. Instead, in equilibrium, the competitive
window contains a.s. infinitely many limit orders of each type. In [FS16], a precise conjecture
is made about the asymptotics of X− near J−(VL) and X
+ near J+(VL) in equilibrium.
On a rigorous level, even just proving existence of an invariant law for the restricted model
on J(VL) is so far an open problem. However, postulating the existence of such an invariant
law, Luckock was able to calculate the equilibrium distribution of the bid and as prices. We
cite the following result from [Swa18, Thm 1]. Essentially, this goes back to [Luc03, formulas
(20) and (21)], although he only considers the case λ±(I∓) = 0.
Theorem 2 (Luckock’s differential equation) Assume that a Stigler-Luckock model with
demand and supply functions satisfying (A1)–(A4) and ρ = 0 has an invariant law. Let
(Xt)t≥0 denote the process started in this invariant law, and let M
±
t =M
±(Xt) denote the bid
and ask price at time t ≥ 0. Define functions f± : I → R by
f−(x) := P
[
M−t ≤ x
]
and f+(x) := P
[
M+t ≥ x
]
(x ∈ I), (2.6)
which by stationarity do not depend on t ≥ 0. Then f± are continuous and solve the equations
(i) f−dλ+ + λ−df+=0,
(ii) f+dλ− + λ+df−=0,
(iii) f−(I+) = 1 = f+(I−),
(2.7)
where f−dλ+ denotes the measure dλ+ weighted with the density f−, and the other terms have
a similar interpretation.
Consider a Stigler-Luckock model satisfying (A1)–(A5), λ±(I∓) = 0 and ρ = 0. Let J be
a subinterval such that J ⊂ I. Then it has been shown in [Swa18, Prop. 2] that Luckock’s
equation (2.7) for the restricted model (X ′t )t≥0 on J has a unique solution (f−, f+). By
Theorem 2, if the restricted model on J has an invariant law, then
f−(J−) = P
[
X
′−
t = 0
]
and f+(J+) = P
[
X
′+
t = 0
]
(2.8)
are the equilibrium probabilities that the restricted model (X ′t )t≥0 contains no buy or sell limit
orders, respectively. In particular, if the restricted model on J has an invariant law, then these
quantities must be ≥ 0, and if the restricted model is positive recurrent they must be > 0. In
[Swa18, Thm 3] it is shown that conversely, if f−(J−)∧ f+(J+) > 0, then the restricted model
on J is positive recurrent. For intervals of the form J(V ) =
(
λ−1− (V ), λ
−1
+ (V )
)
as in (2.2), it
is shown in [Swa18, Prop 2 and formula (1.22)] that
• If Φ(V ) < 1/V 2W, then f−(λ
−1
− (V )) > 0 and f+(λ
−1
+ (V )) > 0.
• If Φ(V ) = 1/V 2
W
, then f−(λ
−1
− (V )) = 0 = f+(λ
−1
+ (V )).
(Here Φ is the function defined in (2.3).) In particular, if VL < Vmax, then Luckock’s equation
has a unique solution (f−, f+) on the competitive window J(VL), and this solution satisfies
f−(J−(VL)) = 0 = f+(J+(VL)), which indicates that the bid and ask prices never leave the
competitive window.
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Figure 2: Simulation of the uniform Stigler-Luckock model of Figure 1 for different values of
the rate ρ of market makers. Shown is the state of the order book after the arrival of 10, 000
traders. The histograms for ρ = 0.6 have a different vertical scale.
3 Behavior of the model with market makers
3.1 Numerical simulation
In Figure 2, we show the results of numerical simulations of the “uniform” Stigler-Luckock
model with I = [0, 1], λ−(x) = 1 − x, and λ+(x) = x, for different rates ρ of market makers.
We observe that as ρ is increased, the size of the competitive window decreases, until for
ρ = ρc = 0.5, it closes completely and the bid and ask prices settle at the Walrasian price
xW. If the rate ρ of market makers is increased even more beyond this point, we observe an
interesting phenomenon. In this regime, the bid and ask prices converge to a random limit
which is different each time we run the simulation, and which in general also differs from the
Walrasian price xW. The reason for this is a huge surplus of limit buy and sell orders placed
by market makers on the current bid and ask prices, which is capable of “freezing” the price
at a random position.
In the coming subsections, we will demonstrate that the critical rate ρc of market makers
for which the competitive window closes completely is for continuous models given by ρc = VW,
the Walrasian volume of trade. We will argue that for ρ < VW, the equilibrium distributions of
the bid and ask prices are still given by the unique solutions of a differential equation, similar
to the one for the model with λ±(I∓) = 0. For ρ ≥ VW, we will prove that the bid and ask
price converge to a common limit and determine the subinterval of possible prices where this
limit can take values.
3.2 Stationary models
In the present subsection, we show how for 0 < ρ < VW, one can calculate the competitive
window and the equilibrium distributions of the bid and ask prices by methods similar to those
for ρ = 0. We first investigate how Luckock’s differential equation changes in the presence of
market makers.
Theorem 3 (Luckock’s differential equation) Theorem 2 generalizes to ρ ≥ 0 provided
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we modify Luckock’s equation (2.7) to
(i) f−dλ+ + (λ− − ρ)df+=0,
(ii) f+dλ− + (λ+ − ρ)df−=0,
(iii) f−(I+) = 1 = f+(I−).
(3.1)
Proof We first show that f± are continuous. By symmetry, it suffices to do this for f−. Right
continuity is immediate from the continuity of the probability measure P. To prove continuity,
it suffices to prove that P[M−t = x] = 0 for all x ∈ (I−, I+]. This is clear for x = I+. Imagine
that P[M−0 = x] > 0 for some x ∈ (I−, I+). Since X0 ∈ Sord, there are initially finitely many
buy limit orders in [x, I+). By assumption (A4), there is a positive probability that these
buy limit orders are all removed at some time before time one, while by assumption (A2), the
probability of a new buy limit order arriving at x after such a time is zero. This proves that
P[M−1 = x] < P[M
−
0 = x], contradicting stationarity.
To prove (3.1), we observe that by stationarity, for each measurable A ⊂ I that is bounded
away from I−, sell limit orders are added in A at the same rate as they are removed. This
yields the equation
∫
A
P[M−t < x] dλ+(dx) + ρ
∫
A
P[M+t ∈ dx] =
∫
A
λ−(x)P[M
+
t ∈ dx]. (3.2)
Here, the first term on the left-hand side is the frequency at which sell limit orders are added
at a price x ∈ A while the current bid price is lower than x, the second term on the left-hand
side is the frequency at which market makers add sell limit orders at the current ask price,
and the right-hand side is the frequency at which sell limit orders at the current ask price are
removed because of the arrival of a buy limit order at a lower price or the arrival of a buy
market order. Using also continuity of f−, (3.2) proves (3.1) (i). The proof of (ii) is similar
while the boundary conditions (iii) follow from the fact that M−t < I+ and M
+
t > I− a.s.
Assume (A1)–(A5), fix ρ and define λ˜± := λ± − ρ. Then dλ˜± = dλ± and hence (3.1) is
just Luckock’s original equation (2.7) with λ± replaced by λ˜±. In particular, if ρ < VW, then
V˜max := sup
{
V ≥ VW : λ˜−(λ
−1
+ (V )) ∧ λ˜+(λ
−1
− (V )) > 0
}
(3.3)
satisfies VW < V˜max, and for each V ∈ (VW, V˜max), the functions λ˜± are positive on the
subinterval J(V ) = (λ−1− (V ), λ
−1
+ (V )). This suggests that for the model with market makers,
Luckock’s volume of trade should be given by (2.4) but with Vmax replaced by V˜max and with
the functions λ± in the definition of Φ in (2.3) replaced by λ˜±.
Defining VL by this formula, if VL < V˜max, then [Swa18, Prop. 2] tells us that (3.1) has
a unique solution (f−, f+) on the competitive window J(VL) = (λ
−1
− (VL), λ
−1
+ (VL)), which
should give the equilibrium distribution of the bid and ask prices. Moreover, since V˜max
(which depends on ρ) decreases to VW as ρ ↑ VW, we see that VL ↓ VW and the size of the
competitive window decreases to zero as ρ ↑ VW.
3.3 The regime with many market makers
In the previous subsection, we have argued that the competitive window has a positive length
for each ρ < VW but its length decreases to zero as ρ ↑ VW. In the present subsection, we look
at the regime ρ ≥ VW. It will be necessary to strengthen assumptions (A1) and (A3) on the
demand and supply functions λ±, to:
(A6) λ− is strictly decreasing on I and λ+ is strictly increasing on I.
10
We have argued in Subsection 1.2 that the assumptions (A1)–(A3) can basically be made
without loss of generality. Moreover, (A4) and (A5) only exclude trivial cases. Assumption
(A6) is restrictive, however. As explained at the end of Subsection 1.2, we can include models
where prices assume only discrete values in our analysis by constructing such models as func-
tions of other models which satisfy (A1)–(A3). However, as is clear from (1.2), these models
will not satisfy (A6), so our result Theorem 4 below does not apply to discrete models.
For models with λ±(I∓) = 0, we generalize our previous definition of the Walrasian volume
of trade VW by setting
VW := sup
x∈I
(
λ−(x) ∧ λ+(x)
)
. (3.4)
Under the assumptions (A2) and (A6), the function λ− ∧ λ+ assumes its maximum over I in
a unique point xW, which we call the Walrasian price. For models with λ±(I∓) = 0, these
definitions agree with our earlier definitions. The following theorem describes the behavior of
Stigler-Luckcock models with ρ ≥ VW.
Theorem 4 (Fixation of the price) Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Stigler-Luckock model with demand
and supply functions λ± satisfying (A2), (A4), and (A6), and rate of market makers ρ satis-
fying ρ ≥ VW, started in an initial state in Sord. Let M
±
t = M
±(Xt) denote the bid and ask
price at time t ≥ 0. Then there exists a random variable M∞ such that
lim
t→∞
M−t = lim
t→∞
M+t =M∞ a.s. (3.5)
Moreover, the support of the law of M∞ is given by {x ∈ I : λ−(x)∨λ+(x) ≤ ρ}. In particular,
if ρ = VW, then M∞ = xW a.s.
We prepare for the proof of Theorem 4 with a number of lemmas, some of which are of
independent interest.
Lemma 5 (Lower bound on freezing probability) Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Stigler-Luckock model
on an interval I with demand and supply functions λ± satisfying (A1)–(A4) and rate of market
makers ρ ≥ 0. Assume that initially M−0 = y where y ∈ I satisfies λ+(y) < ρ. Then
P
[
M−t ≥ y ∀t ≥ 0
]
≥ 1−
λ+(y)
ρ
. (3.6)
Proof Consider the number X−t ({y}) of buy limit orders that are placed exactly at the price
y. At times when M−t = y, this quantity goes up by one with rate ρ and down by one with
rate λ+(y), while at times when M
−
t > y, this quantity does not change at all. Thus, up to
the first time that X−t ({y}) = 0, this process is a random time change of the random walk
on Z that jumps up one step with rate ρ and down one step with rate λ+(y). If λ+(y) < ρ,
then by the well-known gambler’s ruin, this random walk, started in 1, stays positive with
probability 1− λ+(y)/ρ.
Lemma 6 (Bound on the competitive window) Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Stigler-Luckock model
on an interval I with demand and supply functions λ± satisfying (A1)–(A4) and rate of market
makers ρ ≥ 0. Assume that x, y ∈ I satisfy λ−(x) > λ−(y) and λ+(y) < ρ. Then
P
[
lim inf
t→∞
M−t < x and lim sup
t→∞
M+t > y
]
= 0. (3.7)
By symmetry, the same conclusion can be drawn if λ+(x) < λ+(y) and λ−(x) < ρ.
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Proof If we start the process in an intial state such that M+0 ≥ y, then there is a probability
p :=
λ−(x)− λ−(y)
λ−(I−) + λ+(I+) + ρ
> 0 (3.8)
that the first trader arriving at the market places a buy limit order somewhere in the interval
(x, y). By Lemma 5, there is then a probability of at least q := 1 − λ+(y)/ρ > 0 that after
this event, the best buy price M−t never drops to values ≤ x anymore. Thus, letting σ denote
the first time that a trader arrives at the market, we have that
P
[
M−t > x ∀t ≥ σ |M
+
0 ≥ y
]
≥ pq > 0. (3.9)
We claim that this implies (3.7). To see this, set τ0 := 0 and define inductively
σk := inf{t ≥ τk :M
+
t ≥ y} (k ≥ 0),
σ′k := inf{t > σk : a trader arrives} (k ≥ 0),
τk := inf{t ≥ σ
′
k−1 :M
−
t ≤ x} (k ≥ 1),
(3.10)
where the infimum over the empty set is :=∞. By the strong Markov property, P [τk <∞] ≤
(1− pq)k and hence P[τk <∞ ∀k ≥ 0] = 0, which implies (3.7).
Lemma 7 (Freezing) Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Stigler-Luckock model with demand and supply func-
tions λ± satisfying (A2), (A4), and (A6), and rate of market makers ρ satisfying ρ ≥ VW.
Then there exists a random variable M∞ such that
lim
t→∞
M−t = lim
t→∞
M+t =M∞ a.s. (3.11)
Proof If (3.11) does not hold, then there must exist x, y ∈ I with x < y such that
P
[
lim inf
t→∞
M−t < x and lim sup
t→∞
M+t > y
]
> 0. (3.12)
By (A6), making the interval (x, y) smaller if necessary we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that we are in one of the following two cases: I. λ+(y) < ρ, and II λ−(x) < ρ. Using
again (A6), we see that (3.12) contradicts Lemma 6.
Lemma 8 (Bound on possible limit values) Under the assumptions of Lemma 7, the
random variable M∞ from (3.11) satisfies
λ−(M∞) ∨ λ+(M∞) ≤ ρ a.s. (3.13)
Proof By symmetry, it suffices to prove that λ+(M∞) ≤ ρ a.s. Assume the converse. Then
there exists some z ∈ I with λ+(z) > ρ such that P
[
M∞ ∈ (z, I+]
]
> 0. By the continuity of
λ−, for each ε > 0, we can cover the compact interval [z, I+] with finitely many intervals of
the form (x, y) (if y < I+) or (x, y] (if y = I+) such that λ−(x)− λ−(y) ≤ ε. In view of this,
we can find x < y and u > 0 such that λ+(x) > ρ+
(
λ−(x)− λ−(y)
)
and P[x ≤M−t ≤M
+
t ≤
y ∀t ≥ u] > 0.
During the time interval [u,∞), the number of buy limit orders in [x, y) can only increase
when a market maker arrives or a buyer places a buy limit order in [x, y). On the other hand,
the number of buy limit orders in [x, y) decreases each time a trader places a sell market order
or a sell limit order at some price in (I−, x], which happens at times according to a Poisson
process with rate λ+(x). Since λ+(x) > ρ +
(
λ−(x) − λ−(y)
)
, by the strong law of large
numbers applied to the Poisson processes governing the arrival of different sorts of traders,
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we see that a.s. on the event that x ≤ M−t ≤ M
+
t ≤ y ∀t ≥ u, there must come a time when
there are no buy limit orders left in [x, y), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4 Lemmas 7 and 8 show that M±t converge a.s. to a common limit M∞
which takes values in the compact interval C := {x ∈ I : λ−(x) ∨ λ+(x) ≤ ρ}. If ρ = VW,
then by (A6), C consists of the single point C = {xW}. On the other hand, if ρ > VW,
then by (A6), C = [C−, C+] is an interval of positive length. To complete the proof, we
must show that in the latter case, for each C− < x < y < C+, the event M∞ ∈ (x, y) has
positive probability. It is not hard to see that for each X0 ∈ Sord and t > 0, there is a positive
probability that x < M−t < M
+
t < y. Thus, it suffices to prove that if x < M
−
0 < M
+
0 < y,
then P[M∞ ∈ (x, y)] > 0. This is similar to Lemma 5, but we use a slightly different argument.
Note that by (A6), λ−(x) < ρ and λ+(y) < ρ. As long as x ≤M
−
t ≤M
+
t ≤ y, the number
X−t
(
[x, y]
)
of buy limit orders in [x, y] goes up by one with rate at least ρ and decreases by
one with rate at most λ+(y). A similar statement holds for the number of sell limit orders in
(x, y). Let (N−t , N
+
t )t≥0 be a Markov process in Z
2 that jumps with rates
(n−, n+) 7→ (n− + 1, n+) at rate ρ, (n−, n+) 7→ (n− − 1, n+) at rate λ+(y),
(n−, n+) 7→ (n−, n+ + 1) at rate ρ, (n−, n+) 7→ (n−, n+ − 1) at rate λ−(x).
(3.14)
Then (N−t )t≥0 and (N
+
t )t≥0 are independent random walks with positive drift, and hence by
the strong law of large numbers, if N−0 > 0 and N
+
0 > 0, then
P[N−t > 0 and N
+
t > 0 ∀t ≥ 0] > 0. (3.15)
The claim now follows from a simple coupling argument, comparing X±t
(
[x, y]
)
with N±t .
3.4 Conclusion
The Stigler-Luckock model is one of the most basic and natural models for traders inter-
acting through a limit order book, so natural, in fact, that it has been at least four times
independently (re-)invented [Sti64, Luc03, Pla11, Yud12b]. Although it is based on natu-
ral assumptions, its behavior is unrealistic since the bid and ask prices do not settle at the
Walrasian equilibrium price but rather keep fluctuating inside an interval of positive length
called the competitive window. This provides an opportunity for market makers or liquidity
suppliers who make money from buying at a low price and selling at a higher price.
In this paper, we have added such market makers to the model who trade using a very
simple strategy, namely, by placing one buy and sell limit order at the current bid and ask
prices. We have seen that the addition of market makers makes the model more realistic in the
sense that the size of the competitive window decreases. In particular, for continuous models,
if the rate at which market makers place orders equals the Walrasian volume of trade, then
the size of the competitive window decreases to zero and the bid and ask prices converge to
the Walrasian equilibrium price. If the rate of market makers is even higher, then the bid
and ask prices also converge to a common limit, but now the limit price is random and in
general differs from the Walrasian equilibrium price. Moreover, in this regime, some of the
limit orders placed by market makers are never matched by market orders but stay in the
order book forever (on the time scale we are interested in).
In reality, market makers make profit only if their limit orders are matched, and this profit
is proportional to the size of the competitive window. Therefore, in real markets, there is no
motivation for market makers to trade once the size of the competitive window has shrunk to
zero. In view of this, in reality, we can expect a self-regulating mechanism that makes sure
that in the long run, the rate at which market makers place orders is approximately equal
to the Walrasian volume of trade. The effect of this is that in the limit, all trade involves
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market makers, i.e., the buyers and sellers of the original Stigler-Luckock model do not directly
interact with each other but make all their trade with the market makers.
We conclude from this that adding market makers to the Stiger-Luckock model has pro-
duced a more realistic model, especially if the rate of market makers is chosen equal to the
Walrasian volume of trade. Future, better models should include a self-regulating mechanism
that links the rate at which market makers place orders to the present state of the order book
by weighing their expected profit against the costs and risks. Realistic models should also
consider prices that can take only discrete values since in reality the size of the competitive
window and hence the potential for profit for market makers are bounded from below by the
tick size.
References
[Bar05] A.-L. Baraba´si. The origin of bursts and heavy tails in human dynamics. Nature 435
(2005), 207–211.
[BS93] P. Bak and K. Sneppen. Punctuated equilibrium and criticality in a simple model
of evolution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 74 (1993), 4083–4086.
[CG09] A. Gabrielli and G. Caldarelli. Invasion percolation and the time scaling behavior
of a queuing model of human dynamics. J. Stat. Mech. (2009), P02046 (10 pages).
[CST10] R. Cont, S. Stoikov, and R. Talreja. A stochastic model for order book dynamics.
Oper. Res. 58(3) (2010), 549–563.
[CTPA11] A. Chakraborti, I.M. Toke, M. Patriarca, and F. Abergel. Econophysics review II:
Agent-based models. Quant. Finance 11(7) (2011), 1013–1041.
[FS16] M. Formentin and J.M. Swart. The limiting shape of a full mailbox. ALEA 13(2)
(2016), 1151–1164.
[KY18] F. Kelly and E. Yudovina. A Markov model of a limit order book: thresholds,
recurrence, and trading strategies. Math. Oper. Res. 43(1) (2018), 181–203.
[Luc03] H. Luckock. A steady-state model of the continuous double auction. Quant. Fi-
nance 3(5) (2003), 385–404.
[Mas00] S. Maslov. Simple model of a limit order-driven market Physica A 278 (2000),
571–578.
[MS12] R. Meester and A. Sarkar. Rigorous self-organised criticality in the modified Bak-
Sneppen model. J. Stat. Phys. 149 (2012), 964–968.
[Pla11] Jana Placˇkova´. Shluky volatility a dynamika popta´vky a nab´ıdky. (In Czech) Master
Thesis, MFF, Charles University Prague, 2011.
[Sla13] F. Slanina. Essentials of Econophysics Modelling. Oxford University Press, 2013.
[Smi12] M. Sˇmı´d. Probabilistic properties of the continuous double auction. Kybernetika
48(1) (2012), 50–82.
[SRR17] E. Scalas, F. Rapallo, and T. Radivojevic´. Low-traffic limit and first-passage times
for a simple model of the continuous double auction. Phys. A 485(1) (2017), 61–72.
[Sti64] G.J. Stigler. Public regulation of the securities markets. The Journal of Busi-
ness 37(2) (1964), 117–142.
14
[Swa17] J.M. Swart. A simple rank-based Markov chain with self-organized criticality.
Markov Process. Related Fields 23(1) (2017), 87–102.
[Swa18] J.M. Swart. Rigorous results for the Stigler-Luckock model for the evolution of an
order book. Ann. Appl. Probab. 28(3) (2018), 1491–1535.
[Wal74] L. Walras. E´le´ments d’ e´conomie politique pure, ou The´orie de la richesse sociale.
First published 1874; published again in Paris by R. Pichon and R. Durand-Auzias
and in Lausanne by F. Rouge, 1926.
[Yud12a] E. Yudovina. A simple model of a limit order book. Preprint (2012), ArXiv:
1205.7017v2
[Yud12b] E. Yudovina. Collaborating Queues: Large Service Network and a Limit Order
Book. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2012.
15
